Second Home Market Rebounding Strongly

Apr 7 2014, 11:33AM

Although the second home mortgage market experienced a severe decline during the housing downturn, Americans still aspire to buy second homes and have contributed to the growth of the market consistently since it hit its bottom in 2009 Fannie Mae said today.  While most mortgages are still originated to purchase or refinance owner-occupied primary residences, there is a significant market for mortgages to purchase second homes, those that are neither investment properties nor primary residences.  Fannie Mae’s new report issued today, Second Homes:  Recovery Post Financial Crisis, is part of its Housing Insights series.

Second home mortgages have accounted for an average of 4.76 percent of the purchase mortgage market since 1998 and the government sponsored enterprises (GSEs) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have been significant players, acquiring on average about 64 percent of the second home purchase mortgages by volume over that time period.

Fannie Mae uses information from the National Association of Realtors® (NAR) survey of second home buyers released last week to profile a typical second home buyer who is older, has a higher income, and is more likely to use a larger degree of cash to finance his purchase than the typical primary home buyer.  At the time of purchase 70 percent of second home mortgages had loan to value ratios under 80 percent compared with 44 percent of primary residence mortgages.

 

 

Second home mortgage originations have historically moved in tandem with the boom-bust cycle of the real estate market.  The share of second home mortgages more than tripled between the late 1990s and the peak year of 2006 then declined through 2009.  In every year since however the second home share of the purchase-money market (PMM) has increased.  During this period, however, the GSEs share of the market has decreased as the share of whole loans held by banks and other institutions has grown, suggesting that private lenders are becoming more willing to lend to these borrowers.  Between them the GSEs and bank portfolios now hold nearly 100 percent of the market compared to 77 percent in 2006.  Fannie Mae says one of the major reasons for this increase in market share is the exit of private label security (PLS) competitors from the larger playing field after the market collapse.

 

 

The boom years were good for second home mortgages which peaked at more than 15 times their 1998 volume during the housing bubble compared to around a 400 percent increase for other purchase mortgages.  However, the PLS share of second home originations, which was as high as 17 percent in 2006, has not rebounded as second home sales have recovered.

Fannie Mae says that geography played a role in both the decline and resurgence of the second home market.  Since January 1998, just over 1/3 of all second home mortgages have been originated on properties in Florida, California, and Arizona, three of the four states that then entered a multi-year foreclosure epidemic and witnessed huge price declines of over 40 percent each.  The only state with a larger price drop was Nevada, which was not a popular second home destination, accounting for only 2.5 percent of those mortgage originations from 1998 forward.  Those three Sunbelt states did not lose their popularity among second home buyers and accounted again for 34 percent of the second home mortgages originated in 2013.

While second home mortgages bubbled like all other purchase mortgages in the pre-2006 period, they did not perform as poorly as the others when the crisis hit.  While both first home and second home mortgages saw delinquencies trend upward in the years immediately after the bubble the second home purchase series outperformed the all other purchases series, indicating that second home borrowers have been better able to meet their mortgage obligations.

Fannie Mae noted many factors that will affect the future direction of second home purchases and second home mortgage originations.

  • Many buyers are affluent enough to pay cash and according to the NAR, between 2009 and 2013 an average of 38 percent of second home buyers did so. The remaining 62 percent who rely on a mortgage must have adequate income to qualify for those second home mortgage payments.
  • During the recovery housing wealth appreciation has lagged financial wealth. The recovery in financial markets has allowed many second home buyers, who are typically older and more likely to own financial assets, to sell some of their assets to buy second homes or use income from these assets to cover second home mortgage expenses. As shown in Exhibit E, older age cohorts, who are more likely to buy second homes, tend to own more financial assets.

  • The home price recovery rate in the three popular second home sites of Arizona, California, and Florida is another factor. The Federal Housing Finance Agency price indices comparing these three states to national averages show that two of the three have kept up with the national recovery, regaining about one third of their home price peak to trough losses but Florida lags far behind, having reclaimed only about 18 percent since bottoming out. Given this slow recovery and that Florida has accounted for the largest single share of second mortgage originations since 1998 (17 percent), home buyers have an opportunity to invest in Florida at bargain prices. That financial assets have recovered more quickly than home prices further increases this opportunity.
  • Yet another factor is the aging of the American population. The age group most likely to purchase a second home, those between 45 and 64 years of age, will grow at a slower rate than that of the total adult population between 2015 and 2060. Thus, while demand for second homes will continue to grow, it will likely occupy a smaller portion of the total purchase market. However, assuming that Americans continue existing investment patterns as they age and that aspirations of second home ownership do not wane, second homes should still occupy a significant place in the residential real estate market.

Fannie Mae concludes that although the second home mortgage market was also hit hard by the housing downturn, Americans still want to buy second homes and have contributed to the growth of the market consistently since its bottom in 2009.  The GSEs acquired roughly 60 percent of second home mortgage origination volume in 2013 and, barring rapid resurgence in PLS lending, should continue to be major players in the second home mortgage market.  “As the population continues to age, we expect people to continue to use their savings to buy second homes, thereby contributing to a segment of the mortgage market that will continue to grow in the years to come.”

5 best and worst rental return markets | 2014-04-01 | HousingWire

 

 

San Francisco - Bridge

 

Home prices have increased year-over-year for two years straight and do not show any signs of slowing down, the latest CoreLogic report revealed. So how does this impact the rental community and investors?

 

While strong cash-flowing rentals are in many U.S. markets, rising home prices are slowly put a dent in the value.

This follow a strong rise in demand for REO-to-rental securitization.

 

RealtyTrac composed a list of the 5 best and worst markets for rental returns.

 

The list was created by taking the 2014 fair market rent for a three-bedroom home multiplied by 12 months and then dividing that 12-month total by the median sales price of residential properties in the county.

 

Here is what they came up with:

Best:

 

5. Baltimore City County, Md.

 

Media sales price: $85,000

 

The average fair market rent sits at $1,599, and the annual gross yield is 23%.

 

4. Bibb County, Ga.  

 

Median sales price: $50,880

 

On the lower end of the best five, the average fair market rent is $1,008 and the annual gross yield is 24%.

 

3. Washington County, Miss.

 

Median sales price: $42,000

 

The county’s average fair market rent comes in at $862, posting a 25% annual gross yield.

 

2. Clayton County, Ga.

 

Median sales price: $50,750

 

Ranking in at number two, Clayton’s average fair market rent is $1,187, and the annual gross yield is 28%.

 

1. Wayne County, Mich.

 

Median sales price: $44,900

 

As the best rental market for rental returns, Wayne County posts an average fair market rent of $1,124 and an annual gross yield of 30%.

 

skyline
Now for the 5 worst markets for rental returns:

 

5. Marin County, Calif.

 

Median sales price: $745,000

 

The average fair market rent sits at $2,657, while the annual gross yield comes in at 4%.

 

4. Kings County, N.Y.

 

Median sales price: $573,000

 

One of two New York markets on the list, Kings County reported an average fair market rent of $1,852 and an annual gross yield of 4%.

 

3. San Francisco County, Calif.

 

Median sales price: $573,000

 

Significant above number 4, the average fair market rent hit $2,657, with a 4% annual gross yield.

 

2. Eagle County, Colo.

 

Median sales price: $525,000

 

This Colorado market recorded a $1,545 average fair market rent and a 4% annual gross yield.

 

1. New York, N.Y.

 

home

 

Median sales price: $887,000

 

Holding the spot for the worst market for rental returns, New York posted a $1,852 average fair market rent and a 3% annual gross yield.

 

Buffett’s annual letter: What you can learn from my real estate investments

In an excerpt from his upcoming shareholder letter, Warren Buffett looks back at a pair of real estate purchases and the lessons they offer for equity investors.

By Warren Buffett

The author visiting (for just the second time) the 400-acre farm near Tekamah, Neb., that he bought in 1986 for $280,000

The author visiting (for just the second time) the 400-acre farm near Tekamah, Neb., that he bought in 1986 for $280,000

FORTUNE — “Investment is most intelligent when it is most businesslike.” –Benjamin Graham, The Intelligent Investor

It is fitting to have a Ben Graham quote open this essay because I owe so much of what I know about investing to him. I will talk more about Ben a bit later, and I will even sooner talk about common stocks. But let me first tell you about two small nonstock investments that I made long ago. Though neither changed my net worth by much, they are instructive.

This tale begins in Nebraska. From 1973 to 1981, the Midwest experienced an explosion in farm prices, caused by a widespread belief that runaway inflation was coming and fueled by the lending policies of small rural banks. Then the bubble burst, bringing price declines of 50% or more that devastated both leveraged farmers and their lenders. Five times as many Iowa and Nebraska banks failed in that bubble’s aftermath as in our recent Great Recession.

In 1986, I purchased a 400-acre farm, located 50 miles north of Omaha, from the FDIC. It cost me $280,000, considerably less than what a failed bank had lent against the farm a few years earlier. I knew nothing about operating a farm. But I have a son who loves farming, and I learned from him both how many bushels of corn and soybeans the farm would produce and what the operating expenses would be. From these estimates, I calculated the normalized return from the farm to then be about 10%. I also thought it was likely that productivity would improve over time and that crop prices would move higher as well. Both expectations proved out.

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I needed no unusual knowledge or intelligence to conclude that the investment had no downside and potentially had substantial upside. There would, of course, be the occasional bad crop, and prices would sometimes disappoint. But so what? There would be some unusually good years as well, and I would never be under any pressure to sell the property. Now, 28 years later, the farm has tripled its earnings and is worth five times or more what I paid. I still know nothing about farming and recently made just my second visit to the farm.

In 1993, I made another small investment. Larry Silverstein, Salomon’s landlord when I was the company’s CEO, told me about a New York retail property adjacent to New York University that the Resolution Trust Corp. was selling. Again, a bubble had popped — this one involving commercial real estate — and the RTC had been created to dispose of the assets of failed savings institutions whose optimistic lending practices had fueled the folly.

Here, too, the analysis was simple. As had been the case with the farm, the unleveraged current yield from the property was about 10%. But the property had been undermanaged by the RTC, and its income would increase when several vacant stores were leased. Even more important, the largest tenant — who occupied around 20% of the project’s space — was paying rent of about $5 per foot, whereas other tenants averaged $70. The expiration of this bargain lease in nine years was certain to provide a major boost to earnings. The property’s location was also superb: NYU wasn’t going anywhere.

buffett-graph

I joined a small group — including Larry and my friend Fred Rose — in purchasing the building. Fred was an experienced, high-grade real estate investor who, with his family, would manage the property. And manage it they did. As old leases expired, earnings tripled. Annual distributions now exceed 35% of our initial equity investment. Moreover, our original mortgage was refinanced in 1996 and again in 1999, moves that allowed several special distributions totaling more than 150% of what we had invested. I’ve yet to view the property.

Income from both the farm and the NYU real estate will probably increase in decades to come. Though the gains won’t be dramatic, the two investments will be solid and satisfactory holdings for my lifetime and, subsequently, for my children and grandchildren.

I tell these tales to illustrate certain fundamentals of investing:

  • You don’t need to be an expert in order to achieve satisfactory investment returns. But if you aren’t, you must recognize your limitations and follow a course certain to work reasonably well. Keep things simple and don’t swing for the fences. When promised quick profits, respond with a quick “no.”
  • Focus on the future productivity of the asset you are considering. If you don’t feel comfortable making a rough estimate of the asset’s future earnings, just forget it and move on. No one has the ability to evaluate every investment possibility. But omniscience isn’t necessary; you only need to understand the actions you undertake.
  • If you instead focus on the prospective price change of a contemplated purchase, you are speculating. There is nothing improper about that. I know, however, that I am unable to speculate successfully, and I am skeptical of those who claim sustained success at doing so. Half of all coin-flippers will win their first toss; none of those winners has an expectation of profit if he continues to play the game. And the fact that a given asset has appreciated in the recent past is never a reason to buy it.
  • With my two small investments, I thought only of what the properties would produce and cared not at all about their daily valuations. Games are won by players who focus on the playing field — not by those whose eyes are glued to the scoreboard. If you can enjoy Saturdays and Sundays without looking at stock prices, give it a try on weekdays.
  • Forming macro opinions or listening to the macro or market predictions of others is a waste of time. Indeed, it is dangerous because it may blur your vision of the facts that are truly important. (When I hear TV commentators glibly opine on what the market will do next, I am reminded of Mickey Mantle’s scathing comment: “You don’t know how easy this game is until you get into that broadcasting booth.”)

My two purchases were made in 1986 and 1993. What the economy, interest rates, or the stock market might do in the years immediately following — 1987 and 1994 — was of no importance to me in determining the success of those investments. I can’t remember what the headlines or pundits were saying at the time. Whatever the chatter, corn would keep growing in Nebraska and students would flock to NYU.

There is one major difference between my two small investments and an investment in stocks. Stocks provide you minute-to-minute valuations for your holdings, whereas I have yet to see a quotation for either my farm or the New York real estate.

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It should be an enormous advantage for investors in stocks to have those wildly fluctuating valuations placed on their holdings — and for some investors, it is. After all, if a moody fellow with a farm bordering my property yelled out a price every day to me at which he would either buy my farm or sell me his — and those prices varied widely over short periods of time depending on his mental state — how in the world could I be other than benefited by his erratic behavior? If his daily shout-out was ridiculously low, and I had some spare cash, I would buy his farm. If the number he yelled was absurdly high, I could either sell to him or just go on farming.

Owners of stocks, however, too often let the capricious and irrational behavior of their fellow owners cause them to behave irrationally as well. Because there is so much chatter about markets, the economy, interest rates, price behavior of stocks, etc., some investors believe it is important to listen to pundits — and, worse yet, important to consider acting upon their comments.

Those people who can sit quietly for decades when they own a farm or apartment house too often become frenetic when they are exposed to a stream of stock quotations and accompanying commentators delivering an implied message of “Don’t just sit there — do something.” For these investors, liquidity is transformed from the unqualified benefit it should be to a curse.

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A “flash crash” or some other extreme market fluctuation can’t hurt an investor any more than an erratic and mouthy neighbor can hurt my farm investment. Indeed, tumbling markets can be helpful to the true investor if he has cash available when prices get far out of line with values. A climate of fear is your friend when investing; a euphoric world is your enemy.

During the extraordinary financial panic that occurred late in 2008, I never gave a thought to selling my farm or New York real estate, even though a severe recession was clearly brewing. And if I had owned 100% of a solid business with good long-term prospects, it would have been foolish for me to even consider dumping it. So why would I have sold my stocks that were small participation’s in wonderful businesses? True, any one of them might eventually disappoint, but as a group they were certain to do well. Could anyone really believe the earth was going to swallow up the incredible productive assets and unlimited human ingenuity existing in America?

When Charlie Munger and I buy stocks — which we think of as small portions of businesses — our analysis is very similar to that which we use in buying entire businesses. We first have to decide whether we can sensibly estimate an earnings range for five years out or more. If the answer is yes, we will buy the stock (or business) if it sells at a reasonable price in relation to the bottom boundary of our estimate. If, however, we lack the ability to estimate future earnings — which is usually the case — we simply move on to other prospects. In the 54 years we have worked together, we have never forgone an attractive purchase because of the macro or political environment, or the views of other people. In fact, these subjects never come up when we make decisions.

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It’s vital, however, that we recognize the perimeter of our “circle of competence” and stay well inside of it. Even then, we will make some mistakes, both with stocks and businesses. But they will not be the disasters that occur, for example, when a long-rising market induces purchases that are based on anticipated price behavior and a desire to be where the action is.

Most investors, of course, have not made the study of business prospects a priority in their lives. If wise, they will conclude that they do not know enough about specific businesses to predict their future earning power.

I have good news for these nonprofessionals: The typical investor doesn’t need this skill. In aggregate, American business has done wonderfully over time and will continue to do so (though, most assuredly, in unpredictable fits and starts). In the 20th century, the Dow Jones industrial index advanced from 66 to 11,497, paying a rising stream of dividends to boot. The 21st century will witness further gains, almost certain to be substantial. The goal of the nonprofessional should not be to pick winners — neither he nor his “helpers” can do that — but should rather be to own a cross section of businesses that in aggregate are bound to do well. A low-cost S&P 500 index fund will achieve this goal.

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That’s the “what” of investing for the nonprofessional. The “when” is also important. The main danger is that the timid or beginning investor will enter the market at a time of extreme exuberance and then become disillusioned when paper losses occur. (Remember the late Barton Biggs’s observation: “A bull market is like sex. It feels best just before it ends.”) The antidote to that kind of mistiming is for an investor to accumulate shares over a long period and never sell when the news is bad and stocks are well off their highs. Following those rules, the “know-nothing” investor who both diversifies and keeps his costs minimal is virtually certain to get satisfactory results. Indeed, the unsophisticated investor who is realistic about his shortcomings is likely to obtain better long-term results than the knowledgeable professional who is blind to even a single weakness.

If “investors” frenetically bought and sold farmland to one another, neither the yields nor the prices of their crops would be increased. The only consequence of such behavior would be decreases in the overall earnings realized by the farm-owning population because of the substantial costs it would incur as it sought advice and switched properties.

Nevertheless, both individuals and institutions will constantly be urged to be active by those who profit from giving advice or effecting transactions. The resulting frictional costs can be huge and, for investors in aggregate, devoid of benefit. So ignore the chatter, keep your costs minimal, and invest in stocks as you would in a farm.

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My money, I should add, is where my mouth is: What I advise here is essentially identical to certain instructions I’ve laid out in my will. One bequest provides that cash will be delivered to a trustee for my wife’s benefit. (I have to use cash for individual bequests, because all of my Berkshire Hathaway (BRKA) shares will be fully distributed to certain philanthropic organizations over the 10 years following the closing of my estate.) My advice to the trustee could not be more simple: Put 10% of the cash in short-term government bonds and 90% in a very low-cost S&P 500 index fund. (I suggest Vanguard’s. (VFINX)) I believe the trust’s long-term results from this policy will be superior to those attained by most investors — whether pension funds, institutions, or individuals — who employ high-fee managers.

And now back to Ben Graham. I learned most of the thoughts in this investment discussion from Ben’s book The Intelligent Investor, which I bought in 1949. My financial life changed with that purchase.

Before reading Ben’s book, I had wandered around the investing landscape, devouring everything written on the subject. Much of what I read fascinated me: I tried my hand at charting and at using market indicia to predict stock movements. I sat in brokerage offices watching the tape roll by, and I listened to commentators. All of this was fun, but I couldn’t shake the feeling that I wasn’t getting anywhere.

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In contrast, Ben’s ideas were explained logically in elegant, easy-to-understand prose (without Greek letters or complicated formulas). For me, the key points were laid out in what later editions labeled Chapters 8 and 20. These points guide my investing decisions today.

A couple of interesting sidelights about the book: Later editions included a postscript describing an unnamed investment that was a bonanza for Ben. Ben made the purchase in 1948 when he was writing the first edition and — brace yourself — the mystery company was Geico. If Ben had not recognized the special qualities of Geico when it was still in its infancy, my future and Berkshire’s would have been far different.

The 1949 edition of the book also recommended a railroad stock that was then selling for $17 and earning about $10 per share. (One of the reasons I admired Ben was that he had the guts to use current examples, leaving himself open to sneers if he stumbled.) In part, that low valuation resulted from an accounting rule of the time that required the railroad to exclude from its reported earnings the substantial retained earnings of affiliates.

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The recommended stock was Northern Pacific, and its most important affiliate was Chicago, Burlington & Quincy. These railroads are now important parts of BNSF (Burlington Northern Santa Fe), which is today fully owned by Berkshire. When I read the book, Northern Pacific had a market value of about $40 million. Now its successor (having added a great many properties, to be sure) earns that amount every four days.

I can’t remember what I paid for that first copy of The Intelligent Investor. Whatever the cost, it would underscore the truth of Ben’s adage: Price is what you pay; value is what you get. Of all the investments I ever made, buying Ben’s book was the best (except for my purchase of two marriage licenses).

Warren Buffett is the CEO of Berkshire Hathaway. This essay is an edited excerpt from his annual letter to shareholders.

This story is from the March 17, 2014 issue of Fortune.